attempt to define separate and exclusive spheres for national and state action. 7 That model, I shall argue, is largely dead insofar as it operates as a check on national action; it survives, in a somewhat softer form, as a check on state action. But the latter aspect-dual federalism as a way of protecting national authority from incursions by the states-is not what generally concerns dual federalism's critics.
Those critics frequently equate "dual federalism" with any effort to impose constitutional federalism-based limitations on national authority. In the essay to which this commentary responds, for example, Sotirios Barber contrasts dual federalism with "Marshallian federalism," which he takes to be equivalent to the managerial "decentralization" model long advocated by Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin. 8 This sort of position objects not only to a "separate spheres" model but to any model of federalism featuring guarantees of state autonomy that are constitutionally entrenched. Conflating concepts in this way, however, tends not only to confuse discussion but also to obscure the reasons that some approaches to federalism fail while others have more staying power.
This essay considers two ways in which notions of dual federalism persist. The first is the tendency of commentators to insist that the Supreme Court is bent on reviving strict dual federalist limits on national power, even when what the Court actually says and does makes rather clear that it is not. This persistence, in other words, is in the minds of the Court's critics-including Professor Barber, in his essay for this book. The second mode of persistence, however, is reflected in the Court's rhetoric and doctrine. That is the use of dual federalist notions to limit state power, by defining distinct and exclusive spheres of national regulatory activity. In preemption cases, for example, courts have found state law more readily preempted when it intrudes on a sphere of uniquely national concern, such as foreign relations or immigration.
I contend that the Court's critics are right to condemn dual federalism, but wrong to think that the Court has revived dual federalist limits on national power. Properly defined, "dual federalism" connotes separate and exclusive spheres of state and federal authority; it thus exists in contrast to other models of federalism, such as "cooperative" federalism, "collective action" federalism, and "process" federalism. All of these models may rely on principles of dual sovereignty-that is, the broader notion that guarantees of state autonomy vis-a-vis the center should be constitutionally entrenched. While the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have revived this broader principle, they have not attempted to define a separate sphere of state authority that the national government cannot enter.
Dual federalism died in the middle of the twentieth century because the Court found itself unable to draw determinate lines to define the exclusive sphere of state authority into which national power might not enter. That problem applies equally, however, to attempts to define and police an exclusive sphere of national authority; it thus plagues the contemporary cases in which courts have sought to keep states out of "uniquely federal" fields like foreign affairs, national banking, or immigration. But the linedrawing problem is not inherent in all efforts to protect other forms of state sovereignty; I thus reject Professor Barber's more general critique of dual sovereignty in all its forms. If we are to keep faith with our constitutional commitments, then federalism is not optional. As Jenna Bednar and William Eskridge have written, " [c] onstitutional law must make some sense of federalism." 9 1. SOME DEFINITIONS It will help to begin by defining some terms. Words like "dual federalism" are used in a variety of ways in the literature, and I do not mean to suggest that the definitions offered here are the only plausible ones. I do think that the conceptual distinctions drawn here matter, both theoretically and practically, and that whatever terms we happen to use, it will help to be more explicit about precisely what we mean.
Alpheus Mason described "dual federalism" as contemplating "two mutually exclusive, reciprocally limiting fields of power-that of the national government and of the States. The two authorities confront each other as equals across a precise constitutional line, defining their respective jurisdictions." 10 In his famous essay, Edward Corwin said that dual federalism entailed four "postulates": [1. ] The national government is one of enumerated powers only; 2. Also the purposes which it may constitutionally promote are few; 3. Within their respective spheres the two centers of government are "sovereign" and hence "equal"; 4. The relation of the two centers with each other is one of tension rather than collaboration."
Although Professor Corwin's postulates are somewhat more elaborate than Mason's definition, both statements share a common theme: Article I's limits on Congress's powers and purposes (postulates 1 and 2) define separate "spheres" of sovereignty for the federal and state governments (postulate 3), neither of which permits intrusion or activity by the other level of government (postulate 4). It is this notion of separate "spheres" or "enclaves" that has set dual federalism apart from other approaches to federalism for later generations of commentators. 12 I want to distinguish dual federalism from dual sovereignty, although I acknowledge that the two terms are often used interchangeably. While dual federalism refers to a particular relationship between national and state authorities, I use "dual sovereignty" more generally to describe the Federalists' great innovation in political theory, which accommodated the separate authority of the states to classical political theory's requirement of a single "sovereign" in every polity by lodging that ultimate sovereignty in the American people. 13 As Justice Souter has explained, " [T] he People possessing this plenary bundle of specific powers were free to parcel them out to different governments and different branches of the same government as they saw fit."
14 Dual sovereignty thus means that the federal and state governments are "each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other." 15 There is, of course, much disagreement about the precise meaning of what Robert Cover and Alex Aleinikoff called "the lawyer's disease of sovereignty." 16 In our constitutional system, neither the national government nor the states possess the sort of unquestionable ultimate authority that the European theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries meant by "sovereignty." 17 The
Federalists thus used "dual sovereignty" as something of a debating point, co-opting the rhetoric of their opponents while advocating something completely different from the traditional unitary authority of the king in Parliament. 18 And "sovereignty" is an even more contested term in our contemporary political environment, constandy under threat from policy concerns that disrespect territorial boundaries, broad conceptions of individual rights against government, the proliferation of international law and institutions, and the rise of complex intergovernmental institutional arrangements that blur traditional jurisdictional lines. 19 Nonetheless, "dual sovereignty" does capture an important truth about American federalism: although nonfederal regimes may make the political choice to decentralize certain functions, the "sovereignty" of the states and the federal government means that at least some elements of the American allocation of authority are enforceable as a matter of legal right. This, for Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley, is the key distinction between "federalism" and "decentralization." 20 What "dual sovereignty" means in practice is that the federal arrangement is constitutionally entrenched-that is, it cannot be changed without constitutional amendment, which is of course very difficult to do. 21 This element of entrenchment is critical to a wide range of definitions of federalism in both law and political science. Jenna Bednar, for example, defines a federal system as one meeting "three structural criteria"-geopolitical division according territory to each state unit, independent electoral bases of authority for state and national governments, and "policy sovereignty" for each level of government over some issues. 22 Importantly, she presumes that each of these structural characteristics must be constitutionally entrenched. 23 And the Supreme Court, of course, has long maintained that "'the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States. ' " 24 Much of our federalism, of course, is not entrenched. As I have argued elsewhere, in many ways the most practically important boundaries between, national and state authority are set by federal statutes, agency regulations, or even defeasible judicial doctrines like the dormant Commerce Clause, 25 and perhaps it would be better if we spent more time talking about those arrangements and less time arguing about sovereignty. 26 But as will be apparent, it remains an important point of division in debates about federalism whether any element of the federal arrangement is not subject to change through ordinary law.
Professor Barber seems to mean something like dual sovereignty when he says "dual federalism." He says, for instance, that "[d]ual federalism . . . sees the Constitution as a collection of restraints on the national government, one kind of restraint being 'states' rights. ' " 27 This is hardly the only thing that dual sovereignty means; as I have argued elsewhere, the point of state sovereignty is not simply to limit national power but also to preserve the states' ability to provide beneficial regulation and governmental services to their citizens. 28 But the key difference between dual sovereignty and the model of managerial decentralization proposed by Professors Feeley and Rubin is whether states do, in fact, have legally enforceable "rights" against the national authority. When Barber argues in favor of a national "authority to delegate and recall responsibility" 29 vis-a-vis the states, he is arguing not only against dual federalism but against dual sovereignty as well.
The key point for present purposes is that "dual sovereignty" is a broader term than "dual federalism"; the former holds that ultimate authority is split between two types of governments in our political system, while the latter describes a particular model for what that division of authority might look like. Defining separate and exclusive spheres of state and national authority is one way to maintain a regime of dual sovereignty, but as I discuss in the next section, there are others as well. 30 We might, for instance, focus on the institutional integrity of state governments themselves, or on the political mechanisms by which their interests are represented in the political process.
Professor Barber is thus right to argue that "the dual federalist view ... is an option to be weighed against competing options; it's not a conclusion compelled by constitutional language, logic, or history." 31 But that is correct only in the limited sense in which I am using "dual federalism" here. That model is one among several that is consistent with "constitutional language, logic, [and] history." But to the extent that Barber is using "dual federalism" in a broader sense-that is, to connote a commitment to some meaningful principle of state sovereignty and a "limited [national] government" vis-a-vis the states-that commitment is not constitutionally optional.
32 This is well-trod ground in the literature, and surely any assertion that the Constitution contains no such princir pie ought to grapple with the great weight of both jurisprudential and scholarly authority to the contrary. 33 In rejecting any entrenched notion of dual sovereignty, Professor Barber relies on Madison's statement that "as far as the sovereignty of the states cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people ... let the former be sacrificed to the latter." 34 It is critical to remember, however, that Madison was arguing at a stage when the Constitution had not yet been adopted. After all, he said the same thing about the Constitution itself ("Were the plan of the Convention adverse to the public happiness, my advice would be, reject the plan.") and the Union ("Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public happiness, [my advice] would be, abolish the Union."). 35 The people having made their choice to adopt the set of institutional arrangements offered in the Philadelphia draft (including a significant measure of state sovereignty), one can no longer repair directly to the public welfare as a reason to reject, state sovereignty without disregarding the binding force of the Constitution as law. 36 This disagreement may simply reflect a difference (at least in emphasis) between my job, as a professor of law, and Professor Barber's, as a professor of political science. Law has a more limited scope than political science for arguments directly from general principles of public welfare. As Justice O'Connor observed in New York v. United States, "[o]ur task would be the same even if one could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone. It consists not of devising our preferred system of government, but of understanding and applying the framework set forth in the Constitution."
37 It is thus all well and good to argue that a system of nonentrenched decentralization would better pursue particularly national conceptions of liberty and other values, but lawyers and judges are limited by obligations of fidelity to the law that stand apart from these values. 38 
Alternatives to Dual Federalism
Dual federalism provided the model for our law of intergovernmental relations for roughly the first century and a half of our national existence. It died, for reasons I shall canvass shortly, in the New Deal revolution of 1937. And in truth, for much of the time since 1937 there has seemed to be little left of dual sovereignty either, as the Supreme Court has frequently seemed reluctant to enforce any constitutional limits on national authority. As I have already suggested, however, dual sovereignty-based limits can take a variety of forms that do not involve an attempt to define and police separate and exclusive spheres of state and national authority. I sketch some of those alternative models in this section. I begin, however, with the nationalist model that Professor Barber appears to advocate.
Managerial Decentralization or "Marshallian Federalism" It is a little hard to know for sure what Professor Barber means by "Marshallian federalism." He offers a definition at the outset of his essay: "Marshallian federalism holds that when the nation's government is pursuing authorized constitutional ends it may freely disregard the reserved powers of the states." 39 But that formulation is perfectly consistent with "dual federalism" as it has been described in the literature and practiced by the Court; everything turns, of course, on what "constitutional ends" the national government is "authorized" to pursue. Dual federalism held that those ends are confined to a distinct sphere of governmental activity, but because that sphere is exclusive, the states could have no reserved powers to get in the way. If Barber's target is simply the notion that a state may interpose its own law to block the effect of a national law that falls within Congress's enumerated powers, then he is truly pushing on an open door.
It is clear from Professor Barber's discussion, I think, that he means something more restrictive than this. Throughout his essay, he decries the notion of enforceable "states' rights" and urges that the national authority should be able to pursue national ends-like liberty or democracy-by calibrating the allocation of power between national and state institutions as the circumstances dictate. 40 The implicit assumption seems to be that the national government will always be "better" on issues of democracy than those of the states. While that is certainly sometimes true, it has not always been the case. 41 Recognizing this reality, Alexander Hamilton (not exactly a states' righter) emphasized the need for both state and national governments to serve as checks on one another:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. But it is the very possibility of legitimate normative disagreement that Professor Barber seems to reject:
Locating constitutional authority in one place, instead of thirteen or fifty, is necessary because the decision to delegate discretion or recall it must flow from one judgment regarding ends and means. Liberty is best served if the best feasible conception of liberty is served. Some authority has to judge among competing conceptions in particular situations. . . . One institution is obviously superior to many because to be effective many institutions would have to concur in one conclusion or one consistent set of conclusions regarding means and ends. 45 One wonders if the American political system is really set up to render such a unitary conception of the good, even if we disregard the states. Not only is Congress a "they," not an "it,"
46 with noto- The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government. The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself. 51 It is certainly true that the thrust of the Great Chief Justice's federalism decisions was to carve out a place for the fledgling national government and rein in the centrifugal impulses of the states. But that hardly means that Marshall stood ready to abandon all constitutional constraints on national power, and one can readily imagine that he would be shocked at the extent of national authority today. It is no coincidence that Rubin and Feeley, upon whom Barber seems to pattern his position, bill their managerial concept of decentralization as a modern remedy for an outdated "neurosis." Certainly there is nothing traditional, let alone Marshallian, about it.
Cooperative (and Uncooperative) Federalism Cooperative federalism eschews the separate spheres of dual federalism and embraces the reality that, in modern America, "virtually all governments are involved in virtually all functions. . . . [T] here is hardly any activity that does not involve the federal, state, and some local government in important responsibilities."
52 Philip
Weiser has explained:
In contrast to a dual federalism, cooperative federalism envisions a sharing of regulatory authority between the federal government and the states that allows states to regulate within a framework delineated by federal law. In particular, modern regulatory programs put in place across a variety of fields ranging from nearly all environmental programs to telecommunications regulation to health care ... all embrace a unified federal structure that includes a role for state implementation. 53 Under cooperative federalism, then, national authorities do not merely possess concurrent regulatoryjurisdiction; the actual activity of each government is closely integrated with that of the other.
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Advocates of constitutional limitations on national authority have often regarded cooperative federalism with suspicion, seeing the subordinate role of state officials within federal regulatory schemes as reflecting a "concentration of political powers in the national government." 55 Larry Kramer has pointed out, however, that in a cooperative system, " [t] he federal government needs the states as much as the reverse, and this mutual dependency guarantees state officials a voice in the process." 56 He concedes that this is "[n]ot necessarily an equal voice: because federal law is supreme and Congress holds the purse strings, the federal government is bound to prevail if push comes to shove. But federal dependency on state administrators gives federal officials an incentive to see that push doesn't come to shove, or at least that this happens as seldom as possible, and that means taking state interests into account." 57 More recently, Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken have taken this insight and run with it to develop a model of "uncooperative federalism," which "occurs when states carrying out the Patriot Act refuse to enforce the portions they deem unconstitutional, when states implementing federal environmental law use that power to push federal authorities to take a new position, or when states relying on federal funds create welfare programs that erode the foundations of the very policies they are being asked to carry out." 58 This phenomenon, they note, occurs "in such varied arenas as immigration, healthcare, and education. In each of these fields, states use regulatory power conferred by the federal government to tweak, challenge, and even dissent from federal law."
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One may think of "uncooperative federalism" as a particular form of Morton Grodzins's general idea of "decentralization by mild chaos." 60 Despite the absence of clear lines demarcating state and national power, the reality of multiple power centers and the myriad opportunities to exert influence guarantee meaningful checks on central authority. Thus described, however, uncooperative federalism seems like a practical consequence of particular institutional forms of managerial decentralization, rather than an alternative model of dual sovereignty. Nonetheless, at least some approaches to cooperative federalism retain a place for sovereignty.
In particular, the anticommandeering doctrine imposes an important constitutional constraint on Congress's ability to enlist the states as implementers of federal law. That doctrine holds that Congress may not require the legislative and executive institutions of state government to enact legislation pursuant to federal directives, enforce the requirements of federal law, or otherwise serve as the instruments-as opposed to the objects-of federal regulation. 61 Because Congress may not simply command such implementation, it must secure the states' consent by making participation in the federal scheme attractive. Likewise, constitutional constraints on Congress's authority to condition grants of federal monies on state acquiescence in federal mandates 52 ensure that states retain some enforceable rights against the national government even in cooperative federalism schemes. The presence of these constraints ensures that some aspects of the federal structure remain constitutionally entrenched, even within a cooperative federalism scheme.
Subsidiarity or Collective Action Federalism
A second model of dual sovereignty reasons from the underlying values that a federal system is meant to serve. Donald Regan has argued, for example, that "in thinking about whether the federal government has the power to do something or other, we should ask what special reason there is for the federal government to have that power. What reason is there to think the states are incapable or untrustworthy?" 63 Professor Regan's approach bears a strong family resemblance to the European Union's principle of "subsidiarity," under which "the Community shall take action . . . only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and therefore by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community." 64 The Member States of the EU added subsidiarity to the EU's governing treaties as a result of fears that the original documents-which like the American Constitution relied on specific enumerations of the EU's powers-were insufficiently protective of Member State prerogatives. 65 In this country, the most extended and thoughtful attempt to realize a subsidiarity-type approach to federalism is the recent work of Robert Cooter and my colleague Neil Siegel. Professors Cooter and Siegel read the Constitution's power grants to Congress in Article I, Section 8 as embodying a single coherent principle of "collective action federalism." 66 In their view, "the clauses of Section 8 . . . authorizfe] Congress to tax, spend, and regulate when two or more states face collective action problems. Conversely, governmental activities that do not pose collective action problems for the states are 'internal to a state' or 'local.' " 67 Congress would therefore be able to legislate to solve a collective action problem whether or not the legislation regulated commercial activity; on the other hand, even regulation of buying and selling might fall outside Congress's power if it did not respond to some difficulty preventing resolution of the problem through action by individual states.
The principal difficulty with subsidiarity-based approaches is that they tend to collapse the constitutional question ("What does the Constitution permit?") into the policy question ("What would it be desirable for Congress to do?"). As numerous commentators have noted, this makes subsidiarity inquiries particularly difficult for courts, which ordinarily depend for their legitimacy on the supposition that they simply enforce the law without secondguessing Congress's policy judgments-that they exercise "judgment," not "will," in Alexander Hamilton's memorable account. 68 This difficulty has bedeviled efforts to enforce subsidiarity as a constitutional principle in the European Union, 69 and commentators (including this one) have raised similar concerns with efforts to develop a similar approach on this side of the pond.
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One may also worry that this logic, taken too far, would leave precious little to the States. As Morton Grodzins pointed out long ago, "[IJnequities of state resources, disparities in educational facilities and results, the gap between actual and potential educational services, and, above all, the adverse national consequences that might follow long-term inadequacies of state-local control would almost certainly, if the choice had to be made, establish education as the exclusive concern of the national government." 71 One suspects that similar arguments could be made in almost any field if one's conception of a collective action problem is sufficiently broad. And to the extent that courts defer to legislative judgments in order to avoid crossing the line into policy making, they will be leaving the foxes in charge of the henhouse.
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The important point for present purposes, however, is that subsidiarity or collective action federalism represents a distinct model of dual sovereignty from dual federalism. It retains an aspect of sovereignty because, according to the model's proponents, the notion that some collective action problem must exist to justify national action is an interpretation of Article I, Section 8-that is, it is an entrenched part of the Constitution. National action without such a justification would thus be unconstitutional. And yet collective action problems-or their absence-may occur in virtually any area of regulatory concern. This approach thus does not yield the separate and exclusive spheres of regulatory activity that characterized dual federalism. 73 Some aspects of criminal law, or environmental law, or any other field will raise collective action problems, while others may not. The justification for any given national endeavor must be judged on its own merits, regardless of the field in which it occurs.
Process Federalism Process federalism has its unlikely origins in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 1 *-a case that William Van Alstyne decried as the "second death of federalism."
75 Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Garcia asserted that "the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the 'States as States' is one of process rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of state autonomy.'" 76 Process federalism thus eschews the exclusive subject matter spheres of state and national authority that characterize dual federalism. Instead, it relies on the political and institutional structure of the national government itself to preserve the autonomy of the states.
As Professor Van Alstyne's memorable phrase suggests, Garcia was initially either lamented or hailed as the end of the line for state sovereignty. 77 Both friends and foes of constitutional limitations on national authority assumed that the abandonment of substantive limits really connoted an abandonment of any limits at all. This turned out not to be true, however. Just as John Hart Ely has shown that a process-based theory of individual rights can provide a powerful basis for judicial review, 78 so too process federalism has turned out to provide vigorous protection for state autonomy. 79 In both instances, process theory simply shifts the focus from the substantive character of governmental action to the institutional process by which the government acts.
Professor Ely's idea was that our system of government ordinarily safeguards individual liberties through the political process of democratic representation; courts play a supporting role, stepping in whenever there is reason to believe that the ordinary democratic process has become skewed (e.g., through restrictions on political participation) or particular groups have been systematically excluded (e.g., racial minorities). 80 Process federalism similarly builds on Herbert Wechsler's insight (derived in turn from James Madison and John Marshall) that the first-line protection for federalism in our governmental system is the political representation of the states in Congress. 81 Building on Wechsler, other scholars have stressed the role of political parties as well as more particular institutional features, such as the role of state legislatures in redistricting for federal congressional districts. 82 Other process federalists have emphasized the procedural protections that states derive from the many impediments to federal lawmaking. As Brad Clark has explained, "The lawmaking procedures prescribed by the Constitution safeguard federalism in an important respect simply by requiring the participation and assent of multiple actors. These procedures make federal law more difficult to adopt by creating a series of 'veto gates.' ... [T]he imposition of cumbersome federal lawmaking procedures suggests that the Constitution reserves substantive lawmaking power to the states and the people both by limiting the powers assigned to the federal government and by rendering that government frequently incapable of exercising them."
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Supreme Court doctrine has reinforced these political and procedural safeguards of federalism in a variety of ways. Most important, the Court has constructed an array of "clear statement" rules of statutory construction, triggered whenever Congress acts in a way that implicates the prerogatives and/or autonomy of the states. These rules require a clear expression of Congress's intent before a federal statute may be construed to regulate the public functions of state governments, 84 impose financial liability on the states, 85 abrogate state sovereign immunity, 86 impose conditions on the grant of federal funds to state governments, 87 or preempt state law.
88 While these canons of statutory construction are not uncontroversial, 89 they are best understood as an extension of the underlying federalist constitutional principles. 90 They enhance the political safeguards of federalism by requiring proponents of federal laws affecting the states to put the states' defenders in Congress on notice; they enhance the procedural safeguards by adding an additional drafting hurdle that legislation implicating state autonomy must surmount. As a practical matter, it is fair to say that the Court's clear statement cases have preserved a great deal more state autonomy than its largely symbolic efforts to police the substantive boundaries of the Commerce Clause.
Similarly, one can best understand the anticommandeering doctrine of New York and Printz m as a tool of process federalism. Federal commandeering-that is, the power of Congress to require state institutions to implement federal law--allows national authorities to foist many of the costs of national action onto state institutions. These include financial costs, because states must bear the costs of implementation without any requirement that Congress reimburse them, and political costs, because state officials often become the public face of unpopular federal programs (like nuclear waste disposal in New York and limits on gun purchases in Printz). 92 The anticommandeering doctrine does not, in practice, prevent the states from implementing federal law; as I have already said, cooperative federalism arrangements are pervasive in our system. But because the doctrine requires Congress to solicit rather than command state implementation, the states can insist on compensation for their expenses and refuse to participate in the most unpopular programs. 93 This measure of independence from outright federal control may also enhance the ability of state administrators within cooperative federalism regimes to use the administrative process to influence and/or resist federal policy.
Professor Barber makes some very odd assertions about process federalism; for instance, he claims that the process federalist "will eventually claim that the only good anyone can really know is pleasure centered on the individual human body." 94 1 suspect this conclusion would come as a major surprise to scholars (like this one) who have long advocated process federalism. As I have already suggested, it may be more constructive to engage the arguments that process federalists actually make-Barber's essay is devoid of citation to any work that actually discusses process federalism-than to theorize about what arguments process federalists must make. In any event, what actually distinguishes process-based from dual federalism models is simply the former's focus on the political and procedural dynamics by which the states participate in the national political process and federal actors construct supreme federal law. Get those dynamics right, the process federalist contends, and one need not worry about whether particular national initiatives intrude into some protected state sphere of authority.
Immunity Federalism A final model is rarely discussed distinctively in the literature but is quite prominent in the Court's case law. That model is "immunity federalism," which seeks to protect the institutions of state government themselves from being subjected to or held accountable for violations of national law. 95 Dual federalism emphasized affirmative authority to regulate-that is, to prescribe legal rules governing the conduct of nongovernmental actors. It was thus concerned, for example, with whether national or state authorities get to control the legal regime governing public education or immigration. Immunity federalism, by contrast, is relatively unconcerned with affirmative regulatory jurisdiction; it sets no limits on the scope of national regulatory authority over private individuals. This model concerns national regulation solely as it impacts the institutions of state governments themselves. A good example is thus National League of Cities v. Usery 96 which did not challenge Congress's authority to regulate the wages and hours of all privately employed workers in the United States but did restrict its right to apply those regulations to state governmental employees.
The most obvious flowering of immunity federalism has, of course, occurred in the Supreme Court's cases construing the sovereign immunity of states from lawsuits by private individuals and corporations. More than a century ago, in Hans v. Louisiana, 97 the Court construed the scope of this immunity to extend significantly beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment, which had generally been considered the source of state sovereign immunity. 98 Much more recendy, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida 99 the Court held that Congress may not subject states to suit when they violate federal law by enacting statutes that "abrogate" the states' immunity, at least when Congress acts pursuant to its Article I powers. Subsequent decisions have extended this principle to suits in state courts and before federal administrative agencies, notwithstanding the limitation of the Eleventh Amendment's text to "the judicial power of the United States," 100 and an impressive line of cases has narrowly construed Congress's exceptional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity when it acts pursuant to its power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. 101 The important point about all of this is that state sovereign immunity does not protect a single square inch of state regulatory "turf from federal intrusion; it simply exempts the states from (one means of) accountability when they themselves violate federal law. 102 A final, less frequently remarked instance of immunity federalism appears in the Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence. Although habeas has recently played a prominent role in the national War on Terror as a remedy for detention by national executive authorities, by far its most common use is as a vehicle for collateral review of state criminal convictions for compliance with the procedural requirements of federal constitutional law. 103 Habeas corpus is thus another mechanism for holding states accountable when they violate federal law, and the extensive jurisprudence of the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts limiting the scope of federal habeas review is thus another instance of immunity federalism. 104 (In this, it is worth noting, the Court has been encouraged and even surpassed by Congress itself, which passed extensive restrictions on habeas as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in 1996.) 105 Importantly, the number of state sovereign immunity and habeas corpus decisions by the Supreme Court over the course of the "federalist revival" dwarfs the number of cases considering substantive limitations on Congress's powers.
The point of this survey of the multifarious models of contemporary federalism doctrine is to show that dual federalism and managerial decentralization are not the only choices for allocating authority between the national government and the states, and that dual sovereignty may be maintained in other ways than by defining separate and exclusive spheres of state and national authority. These models, like any analytical construct imposed upon an unruly and variegated set of real-world decisions and structures, are vague around the edges, often overlap, and indeed may not be mutually exclusive; process federalism, for example, can be a valuable tool to preserve some measure of state sovereignty in an institutional structure of cooperative federalism. The important point is that there is a tendency to assume that any rule of law that accords some measure of sovereignty to state governments is an instance of "dual federalism," but we should resist that tendency. It is of course a prerogative of scholars to define terms any way that we want, but we lose valuable analytical distinctions when we lump together approaches that are in fact quite different.
THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
Having sketched out the dual federalist model and its competitors, we are in a position to evaluate which of these models best reflects the current state of affairs in intergovernmental practice and constitutional doctrine. My principal contention is that, although scholars and sometimes dissenting judges often worry that the Supreme Court is about to revive dual federalism, it has not in fact done so and is extremely unlikely to do so in the future. Current doctrine and practice instead reflect a blend of managerial decentralization, cooperative federalism, and process federalism.
The Court's restraint, however, has sometimes been unidirectional-that is, it has generally rejected dual federalism in its cases limiting national power, but has often embraced it in its cases limiting state power. These cases tend to define an exclusive sphere of federal authority-most often involving foreign affairs or immigration, but sometimes more prosaic fields like banking-and presumptively exclude state regulatory activity touching on those fields. Neither the results nor the reasoning is categorical, and the Court has actually left far more room for state activity within these presumptively federal spheres than it might have in the heyday of dual federalism. Nonetheless, these cases represent a troubling movement back in the direction of the old unworkable doctrine.
Dual Federalism Is Dead
Dual federalism dominated constitutional law for roughly a century and a half. Beginning in cases like Gibbons, the Court sought to define separate and exclusive spheres of state and federal authority. Because Congress was not eager to exercise its affirmative regulatory powers for most of the nineteenth century, most of the cases involved challenges to state regulation under either the dormant Commerce Clause or the judge-made "general common law"-both of which effectively forbade state intrusion into the "national" sphere of interstate commerce. 105 As federal regulatory efforts increased around the turn of the twentieth century, the courts began to employ dual federalism to restrict those efforts, either by construing federal statutes narrowly to avoid intruding on state spheres of authority 107 or simply by striking them down. 108 The Court upheld as many statutes as it struck down, however, even during the infamous Lochner era. It was thus forced to draw increasingly fine distinctions between goods that were in the "stream of commerce" and those that were not, or between "direct" and "indirect" effects on the interstate market. 109 The advent of the New Deal put increasing pressure on these distinctions, and the Court's eventual capitulation to the national regulatory state in 1937 ultimately swept them away. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 11 " the Court signaled that it would no longer distinguish between phases of the production cycle-that is, between regulation of "manufacturing" or "employment," which had heretofore been a state sphere, and the actual buying, selling, or transport of goods. And in Wickard v. Filburn, ul decided five years later, a unanimous court held that Congress may regulate even individual activities with a minimal impact on commerce, so long as in the aggregate that class of activity would have a substantial effect on the interstate market. By 1950, Edward Corwin could say that the "entire system of constitutional interpretation" embodied in dual federalism lay "in ruins." 112 The question, of course, is whether the "federalist revival" of the Rehnquist Court (and possibly the Roberts Court) has revived dual federalism. Professor Barber and a surprising number of other critics seem to think that it has. 113 Barber fears a "recrudescence of state sovereignty" under which "the states' rights bloc on the Rehnquist Court [has] affirmed the contract theory [under which the states are "separate and independent sovereigns who could nullify unconstitutional national acts and even withdraw from the union"] and voided numerous national acts in the name of 'state sovereignty.'" 114 There are, however, very few citations. The only case from this period that Barber actually mentions by name is U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 which he takes to represent "an endorsement of the contract theory by four members of the Rehnquist Court." 116 One can quibble about whether even that is really true-Term Limits grappled with the Framers' theory of representation in order to construe whether the Constitution's Qualifications Clauses for members of Congress were exclusive, not the limits of Congress's regulatory powers, and invoking the contract theory for the former purpose is quite different from using it to determine the latter.
1 " But putting that aside, Justice Thomas's opinion in Term Limits was a dissent. It struck down nothing and has not been an important source of guidance for any of the decisions in which the Court has struck down federal statutes. Moreover, even Justice Thomas has made clear that he has a sophisticated theory of the Supremacy Clause (which was not at issue in Term Limits) that allows broad scope for federal authority. 118 The best cases for a dual federalist revival would be United States v. Lopez, 119 in which the Court struck down the federal Gun Free School Zones Act as exceeding Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause, and United States v. Morrison, 120 in which the Court similarly invalidated the private civil suit provision of the federal Violence Against Women Act. Lopez was certainly exciting, in the sense that it was the first time that the Court had struck down a federal statute under the Commerce Clause since the New Deal revolution, and many of us took Morrison as confirming that Lopez was not a sport and the Court was, in fact, serious about limiting national power. Neither of these cases, however, amounted to a return to the traditional doctrine of dual federalism. As I have discussed in more detail elsewhere, 121 both cases turned on whether Congress was regulating an act that was "commercial" in nature. The Lopez Court explicitly reaffirmed Wickard v. Filburn 122 and the rest of its post-New Deal jurisprudence, 123 and it denned "commercial" activity so broadly that there are no substantive fields of regulatory concern in which many, if not most, activities will not be subject to federal regulation. 124 Equally important, both Lopez and Morrison made clear that the Court had abandoned the distinction-initially drawn by John Marshall in Gibbons-between commerce "among the several states" and "the exclusively internal commerce of a State." 125 The Rehnquist Court, in other words, was significantly less committed to dual federalism than is "Marshallian federalism."
In any event, the excitement over Lopez and Morrison was shortlived. Five years after Morrison, in Gonzales v. Raich, 126 the Court affirmed Congress's power to regulate the medicinal use of homegrown marijuana, notwithstanding the fact that the marijuana in question had been neither purchased nor transported across a state line. And the Court considered it legally irrelevant that California had enacted a regulatory scheme licensing and regulating the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes. 127 Justice Kennedy joined Justice Stevens's majority opinion, signaling that he was unwilling to find that any significant federal regulatory program lacked the requisite link to commercial activity. And, perhaps most damaging of all to any hopes of a return to dual federalism, Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence embracing a broad view of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which would allow Congress' to regulate even noncommercial activity so long as it bears some relation to a commercial activity that Congress can reach. 128 The Court's recent decision on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) complicates the picture somewhat, but none of the justices endorsed a return to dual federalism. In
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB),
129 a majority of the Court upheld the act's "individual mandate" that all persons must buy health insurance under the taxing power, 130 but a different majority opined that the mandate did exceed the limits of Congress's commerce power. 131 That portion of the opinion-the most relevant for our purposes-did not suggest that health care is somehow an exclusively state sphere of regulation. Rather, the Chief Justice and the four dissenters agreed that the Commerce Clause does not permit Congress to regulate pure inactivity-that is, the decision not to buy health insurance. 132 This is an important holding, both because the PPACA is an important statute and because it reverses the post-Raich impression that the Court might be ready to abandon Lopez and Morrison. But there are not many such mandates in federal law, and the Court's holding at most places a particular regulatory tool off limits rather than isolating a substantive field of regulation as beyond federal competence. 133 Finally, when Professor Barber refers to "numerous national acts" that the Rehnquist Court has "voided ... in the name of 'state sovereignty,' " 1M he can only be referring to the Court's admittedly impressive string of holdings under the Eleventh Amendment doctrine of state sovereign immunity. I agree that these cases are wrongly decided and that they represent an unhelpful focus on state sovereignty rather than state regulatory autonomy. 135 But they hardly represent a return to dual federalism. 136 First, these cases simply invalidate provisions of the relevant federal acts that subject the states to suits by private individuals for money damages; they do not invalidate the underlying substantive requirements of the relevant acts, which continue to bind even the states. It is thus impossible to say that these decisions carve out any exclusive sphere of state authority; they simply restrict the remedies available when states violate the law. Second, these remedial restrictions are radically incomplete: they do not bar suits against state officers for prospective relief or for damages when the officers are sued in their individual capacity. Nor do they bar even suits against the state itself for damages when the United States is the plaintiff or when Congress, through its power of the purse, induces the states to waive their immunity. All these "workarounds" significantly minimize the practical significance of state sovereign immunity. 137 Finally, the Court seems to be in substantial retreat from these holdings, having upheld congressional provisions abrogating state sovereign immunity in several recent decisions. 138 Sixty years later, Professor Corwin is still right: dual federalism lies "in ruins." What we have instead is a complicated and not always coherent set of doctrines emphasizing process federalism (particularly in the Court's "clear statement" rules of statutory construction), 139 an important but narrow rule against "commandeering" state institutions operating within cooperative federalism regimes, and (perhaps) even narrower rules prohibiting use of the commerce power to reach pockets of activity that either have no relation to commerce (Lopez and Morrison) or do not even amount to activity at all (NFIB). The Necessary and Proper Clause, moreover, looms as a congenial catchall power in doubtful cases.
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There are interesting debates to be had concerning whether the Court's current doctrines-both permissive and restrictive-are legitimate, whether they go far enough, and even whether the courts are well suited to balance national and state authority. But it will help, in approaching any of these questions, to appreciate how much the ground has shifted since 1937.
Long Live Dual Federalism ?
Both the Court and the commentators have done their best to inter dual federalism, and for the most part they have succeeded.
But in some areas, dual federalism dies hard. To paraphrase Justice Scalia's famous description of the Lemon test in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence: "Like some ghoul in a latenight horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, [dual federalism] stalks our [federalism] jurisprudence once again." 141 Only this time, it is frightening the proponents of state regulatory activity in fields where the national government has traditionally played a significant role. The tendency to revive dual federalist notions of exclusive national power has been most pronounced in the area of foreign relations law, including recent controversies of state efforts to ratchet up the enforcement of federal laws regulating undocumented aliens. But a similar, if more low-profile, trend has surfaced in the Court's statutory preemption cases. The Court would do better to bring each area into line with its more general federalism doctrine by giving these dual federalist tendencies a speedy quietus.
I wrote in 2001 that the Court seemed to be clinging to a dual federalist view in some of its foreign affairs cases by applying a more vigorous rule of preemption. 142 In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,™ for example, the Court struck down a Massachusetts law limiting state dealings with companies doing business in Burma, notwithstanding the absence' of any explicit federal statutory language preempting such state laws. More recently, the Court seemed to extend Crosby in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, 144 which struck down a California law requiring insurance companies to disclose any connection they might have to Holocaust insurance policies, again in the absence of explicit preemptive language. Both decisions strongly suggested that the states simply had no place regulating the business of foreign relations.
Likewise, in the last year, much of the debate concerning state governmental initiatives to regulate illegal immigration has taken a decidedly dual federalist turn. In particular, the Ninth Circuit's ruling striking down Arizona's restrictive immigration law strongly suggested that states are simply incapable of regulating immigration-this is an exclusively federal field. 149 On review in Arizona v. United States, however, the Supreme Court took a more equivocal position. On the one hand, it suggested that im-migration must be a federal sphere by emphasizing that "foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States must be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States." 146 On the other, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion also acknowledged that the states have a role to play in this field, noting that "[t]he pervasiveness of federal regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to the States."
147 The Court's actual analysis stressed ordinary preemption principles, not doctrines of federal exclusivity, 148 although it does seem fair to say that the Court applied those doctrines with a propreemption thumb on the scale.
Similar echoes of dual federalism can be found in the Court's other preemption cases, where the Court often emphasizes traditional fields of state or federal regulatory authority. Rick Hills has asserted that "the Roberts Court's [preemption] decisions seem to follow a traditional script of dual federalism-that is, carving out separate spheres for state and federal governments and enforcing norms of mutual non-interference between these spheres." 149 A good example is United States v. Locke, 150 in which the Court held that federal law preempted Washington state regulations governing oil tanker safety in Puget Sound that went further than federal requirements. The Court emphasized that maritime safety, which implicated international obligations as well as domestic law, was a traditionally federal field and thus refused to apply any presumption against a preemptive reading of the statute. Locke illustrates not only the backward glance to dual federalism but also the trouble inherent in that glance; after all, it is equally easy to characterize Locke as a case about safeguarding the natural resources of the state-a traditional state sphere. 151 In any event, efforts to revive dual federalism even in these limited nationalist enclaves blink reality. As Grodzins has pointed out, "[fjoreign affairs, national defense, and the development of atomic energy are usually considered to be exclusive responsibilities of the national government. In fact, the state and local governments have extensive responsibilities, directly and indirectly, in each of these fields." 152 This has only become more true in the decades since Grodzins wrote. 153 In our increasingly globalized world, no governmental actor-including states and even localities-can avoid interacting with the rest of the world in a way that implicates national foreign policy. 154 This nationalist version of dual federalism should not be overstated, however. All the cases I have mentioned are statutory construction cases, not efforts to draw hard constitutional lines in the sand, and cases like Arizona seem to leave significant room for state regulation even in areas of federal primacy. Moreover, there are plentiful counterexamples. Just this past term, for instance, the Court upheld a different Arizona law providing for penalties on employers who employ undocumented aliens. 155 The Court not only found the law not preempted; it also went out of its way to say that the law did not implicate any unique field of federal authority. We are far from a revival of dual federalism, but some of the cases in these areas are worrisome nonetheless.
Is DUAL FEDERALISM "SELF-DEFEATING"?
This final section considers two distinct critiques of dual federalism. The first is Professor Barber's, which holds that dual federalism is necessarily incoherent because public goods like liberty and democracy must be defined by national actors in a national forum, leaving no room for more particularistic arguments from "states' rights." The second is more in the vein of conventional wisdom, which believes dual federalism became extinct because it was not susceptible to principled application over time.
Professor Barber's Argument
The central claim of Professor Barber's essay is that dual federalism-by which, as I have said, he seems to mean dual sovereigntyis logically self-defeating. "Should there be a dual federalist as well as a national reading of. . . any . . . matter material to the federalism debate, including the nature of the Constitution as a whole-if there is an interpretive choice of any description, dual federalism will (or should) lose the debate." 156 This proposition extends not only to "the Supremacy Clause," but also to "the Tenth Amendment, or the enumeration of powers, or the breadth of national powers, or the Framers' intentions, or the formation of the Union, or the nature of liberty."
157 Every aspect of our constitutional law, in other words, is to be construed in a nationalist way.
In assessing the scope of this proposition, much would seem to depend on how often we think "there is an interpretive choice of any description." On some issues there may not be. He could not, and that was that; the Court was simply unwilling to transgress Marshall's principle that something must lie outside Congress's enumerated powers. 161 Although some very smart justices dissented in Lopez, I would be tempted to classify it as a case in which there was not "an interpretive choice of any description." I doubt, however, that Professor Barber would agree. Barber sums up his argument this way:
The states' rights debate is a national debate, conducted in a national forum. An admittedly local good can't count as a reason in that forum. The dual federalist who submits to the forum loses the debate before it begins because the good that would justify dual federalism would be a nationally recognized good applied by a national agency as a restraint on the states. 162 It's hard to know what to make of this argument. As an empirical description of the actual debates that take place in national forums, it's simply incorrect. Consider, for example, a typical appropriations debate in Congress. A congressman may well argue for a benefit to his local district-say, a "bridge to nowhere" or a research grant to a local university. To say that people cannot make arguments based on local goods in a national forum is to ignore what goes on in the halls of national government every day. Professor Barber's claim would also render incomprehensible Wechsler's influential argument that the primary protection for state autonomy and prerogatives comes from the states' ability to argue for those things in a national forum-the Congress-through their elected representatives. 163 If a national forum can consider only "national goods"-whatever those are-then how are the "political safeguards of federalism" to operate? Professor Barber's argument is also flatly inconsistent with the role of national courts in enforcing the boundaries of state and national authority in federal systems. Commentators often emphasize that arguments for limiting national power vis-a-vis the subnational units can and should be presented in a national forum-a proposition that Barber argues is simply impossible. The European jurist Koen Lenaerts, for instance, has stated that " [federalism is present whenever a divided sovereign is guaranteed by a national or supranational constitution and umpired by the supreme court of the common legal order." 164 And, in fact, the constitutional courts of many federal systems hear, with some regularity, the sorts of claims that national power must be limited.
165 Alphonso Lopez's (victorious) lawyer would no doubt be surprised to hear that it is impossible to make arguments for limiting national power vis-a-vis the states in a national forum like the Supreme Court.
But perhaps Professor Barber means this to be a normative argument: the only reasons that should count in a national forum are national reasons. It's not clear why this should be true; the argument that states' rights claims must fail because only national reasons should count seems to assume the very point in issue. But even if we grant the premise, it is hardly clear that Barber's conclusion follows. On his view, the appropriation-seeking congressman must explain why a federal expenditure in his district benefits the nation as a whole. But can he not point out that few federal programs benefit all Americans at once, or evenly, and that by benefiting some (his constituents) we benefit the larger whole? 166 That is certainly the premise behind federal disaster relief funds, for example. The broader point is that it may not always be easy to distinguish between national and local goods.
The critical case of this ambiguity is the value of state sovereignty in checking national power. As Madison suggested in The Federalist No. 51, federalism is a central ingredient in our system of checks and balances, part of the "double security" for individual liberty at the heart of the Constitution.
167 If that is right, then why isn't state sovereignty itself a national good? If it is, then it seems to me that Professor Barber's argument collapses in on itself.
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Professor Barber seems to deny that checks and balances can itself be a national good when he says that "Marshall's was a positive constitutionalism; dual federalism belongs to a tradition of negative constitutionalism. Marshall's positive constitutionalism makes more sense than negative constitutionalism because establishing a government to pursue good things makes sense while establishing a government mainly to prevent government from doing bad things makes no sense."
169 This is a highly contestable assertion, of course.
170 Much of constitutional law is concerned with preventing government from doing bad things. 171 The original Constitution was obsessed with dividing and checking governmental power, 172 and Barber's dismissal of "negative constitutionalism" (it "makes no sense") condemns not only federalism but also separation of powers and individual rights. It would condemn Marshall's own jurisprudence, which struck down governmental action when it transgressed constitutional limitations. 173 Moreover, limiting the power of the national government is not simply a "negative" enterprise. Much of the point is to preserve the autonomy of state governments to pursue their own "positive" programs-for example, permitting gay marriage and medicinal marijuana, or protecting the environment more rigorously than federal law-without national interference. 174 In any event, Professor Barber's claim that proponents of state sovereignty simply can't argue for that value in a national forum like Congress or the Supreme Court 175 reminds me of Mark Twain's reply when asked if he believed in infant baptism: "Of course I do," he said. "I've seen it done." People who believe in state sovereignty do make these arguments in national forums, and they are unlikely to stop simply because someone tells them that it's impossible. It is far better, in my view, to engage the arguments that people actually do make on their merits.
Determinate Line Drawing and the Frankfurter Constraint
All that said, I agree with Professor Barber that dual federalismdefined considerably more narrowly than he suggests-is a failed approach; I simply disagree about the reason for that failure. Our disagreement has practical consequences. For one thing, our contrasting accounts of the reason dual federalism must fail point in different directions for the use of dual federalist doctrines to limit state authority. If the problem with dual federalism is that we need a single nationalist vision of liberty and democracy, then we have every reason to defend exclusive zones of national authority, like foreign affairs or immigration, from intrusions by the states.
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But if, as I argue in this section, the real trouble is that exclusive spheres of authority simply cannot be defined and maintained in a principled way, then that difficulty will plague dual federalism whether it is used to restrict state or national power.
Dual federalism was primarily a model of judicial review, and as such it had to be amenable to the institutional constraints faced by courts. As I have argued at greater length elsewhere, 1 ' 7 the primary constraint on courts is that they must make decisions according to law; to invoke Hamilton again, they must exercise "judgment," not "will."
178 Or, as Wechsler put it, judicial decision making must be "principled" in a way that legislative decision making need not be. 179 Most assessments of dual federalism have agreed that dual federalism failed because, especially as the national economy became more integrated and the public came to expect more from government, the separate spheres model became incapable of principled application. As Vicki Jackson has observed, "[W]ithout written guideposts on the content of the enclaves in the face of changing economies and functions of government, the substantive enclave theory is unworkable." 180 In the 1930s, Felix Frankfurter published an analysis of the Supreme Court's nineteenth-century decisions construing the boundaries of dual federalism under the Commerce Clause that emphasized the Court's need and desire to avoid the appearance of "judicial policy-making." 181 Larry Lessig calls this the "Frankfurter Constraint," and he contends that it is fundamental to judicial legitimacy.
182 "[A] rule is an inferior rule," he writes, "if, in its application, it appears to be political, in the sense of appearing to allow extra-legal factors to control its application." 183 And when the Court perceives that it is incurring costs to its legitimacy by pursuing a doctrinal rule perceived to be political, we can expect the Court to abandon that rule and try something else. 184 So it was with dual federalism. A doctrinal model that calls upon the Court to define and police separate and exclusive spheres of state and national authority puts enormous pressure on the Court's ability to draw the boundary line in a principled and consistent way. 185 After a century and a half of trying to draw lines between commercial and police powers regulation, 186 essentially national and essentially local regulation, 187 manufacturing and commerce, 188 items in the "stream of commerce" and those without, 189 and "direct" and "indirect" effects on interstate commerce, 190 the Court found itself under fire for its inability to seem principled in that effort. 191 Perhaps these doctrinal distinctions collapsed under their own weight, causing the Court to change course. 192 Perhaps the perceived inconsistency of the Court's results helped mobilize popular support for President Roosevelt's "court-packing" plan, and the threat of that plan in turn caused the Court's "switch in time." 193 Either way, the point is that the essential indeterminacy of the line between state and national spheres was a key factor in dual federalism's demise. If this is right, then at least as a historical matter, dual federalism did not die because there is anything fundamentally incoherent about the notion of state sovereignty or differing state conceptions of democracy or liberty. There is, then, no necessary impediment to alternative models of dual sovereignty that do not raise the same line-drawing problems. 194 Moreover, if indeterminacy is the root problem with dual federalism, then that problem will afflict any dual federalist model, including one that restricts state power as much as one that restricts national power. The persistent nostalgia for exclusive zones of national power over areas like foreign affairs or immigration, then, remains puzzling.
CONCLUSION
Justice O'Connor said in A^ York v. United States that "discerning the proper division of authority between the Federal Government and the States" is "our oldest question of constitutional law."
195 But the persistence of that question should not blind us to the ways in which the federalism debate has changed over the course of our history. Although the dual federalist model dominated that debate for the first century and a half, it collapsed in 1937 and has found few adherents since. Dual sovereignty remains, and a variety of other models for preserving the constitutional equilibrium between the nation and the states have arisen to take dual federalism's place. But outside of a few pockets wherein the courts seek to maintain exclusive zones of national control over foreign affairs, immigration, and the like, dual federalism has given way to cooperative federalism, subsidiarity, process federalism, and sovereign immunity.
I fear, however, that the puzzling persistence of dual federalism as an analytical category, particularly among critics of the Supreme Court's efforts to enforce constitutional constraints on national power, has distorted federalism's research agenda. We spend too much time discussing the follies of exclusive subject matter categories as a tool for dividing state and federal regulatory jurisdiction, and far too little analyzing the models of federalism that are actually in play. Any number of more fruitful projects call out for study: we are beginning to have some helpful analyses and case studies of the impact of political parties on the political safeguards of federalism, for example, but much more remains to be done. Heather Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen's theoretical account of "uncooperative federalism" called for careful analyses of the way that state and national administrators actually interact in practice, but relatively few have answered the call. And little has been done to bridge the gap between scholars of public administration steeped in the practical intricacies of fiscal federalism and legal scholars analyzing how to interpret the Spending Clause.
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